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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
SEABOARD FINANCE COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
HOWARD G. WAHLEN, and 
BARBARA M. WAHLEN, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF AMICUS 
CURIAE 
Case No. 7890 
GENERAL STATEMENT 
Counsel appreciate the opportunity afforded to file 
their Brief Amicus Curiae to give what assistance they 
can to the Court in resolving the issues presented by this 
appeal. 
For years the Banking . Commissioner and the various 
corporations authorized to~ do business under the Indus ... 
trial Loan law have agreed upon the interpretation of the 
provisions of the act with respect to the manner of com ... 
puting interest and charges-secure in the knowledge 
that such interpretation and construction had been up ... 
held by this Court in the case of Peoples Finance and 
Thrift Company vs. Varney, 75 Utah 355, 285 Pac. 304. 
In the light of the Court's ruling in the Varney case 
it is indeed difficult to see how the present case ever arose. 
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In reviewing the record one can only state that the trial 
court rendered its decision on the basis of the statements 
made during the pretrial and perhaps without fully com ... 
prehending the nature of the problem presented. 
As counsel view the matter the only issue before the 
trial court and the sole point involved on this appeal is the 
interpretation of a section of our Industrial Loan Act, to ... 
wit, 7..-6..-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, (now Title 7, 
Chapter 8, Section 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) which 
provides: 
''To loan money on the personal undertaking of 
the borrower and other persons, or on personal secu ... 
rity, or otherwise, and to deduct interest thereon in 
advance at the rate of 1 per cent or less of the face 
of such loan per month, and in addition, to require 
payment in uniform weekly, semi..-monthly or month ... 
ly installments, with or without an allowance of in ... 
terest on such installments, and to charge a fee of 
$2.00 or less on loans of $100.00 or less, and a maxi ... 
mum fee of 2 per cent on loans in excess of $100.00 
for expense in examining and investigating the char ... 
acter and circumstances of the borrower; . . . '' 
The facts stripped of unnecessary verbiage are that 
the Defendants signed ~note with the Plaintiff for a loan. 
The note was for $1378.38, payable in 24 equal monthly 
installments. The Plaintiff deducted 26 per cent from the 
$1378.38 or $368.38 for interest and fee. The borrower 
received $1020.00, with $20.00 of which he purchased 
insurance. 
The. question: "Does the Utah Statute above quoted 
permit this to be· done?". While we are convinced that 
this question has already been answered by the Utah Su ... 
preme Court in the Varney case, supra, the decision, wi~h ... 
out the prior decision in the Varney case, would still have 
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to be the same as the statute is clear and unequivocal; 
its provisions \vere followed by the lender. 
The statute says the lender may, " ... deduct inter ... 
est ... in advance at the rate of 1 per cent per month 
or less of the face of such loan permo nth. . . . " The 
Plaintiff deducted 24 per cent from $1378.38 or $330.81. 
The statute says " ... and in addition to require 
payment in uniform weekly, semi ... monthly, or monthly in ... 
stallments, with or \Vithout an allowance of interest on 
such installments .... " The Plaintiff's note was payable 
in 24 uniform monthly installments. 
The statute says " ... and to charge ... a maximum 
fee of 2 percent on loans in excess of $100.00 for ex ... 
pense .... " The Plaintiff charged $27.57 ( which is 2 per 
cent of Qle fase _ gf the -1gaa) . This fee was paid to 
Plaintiff by deducting it from the amount Defendants 
would otherwise have received. The Defendants received 
the balance of the amount of the note. 
The Plaintiff followed the clear and unmistakable 
language of the statute. 
An attempt to confuse the Court has been made 
by the back door approach of starting with the amount of 
money that the Defendants received, and the claim that 
the charges should be added to the net proceeds in order 
to determine the amount of the note. We submit the pro ... 
vision in the statute to "deduct interest" in advance is 
not followed by a process of addition. 
It has been argued in this case that given the amount 
of money which the borrower desires to take home with 
him, it involves the use of higher mathematics to deter ... 
mine the amount of the note. That is not so. The pro ... 
cess is one every merchant does constantly in pricing his 
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goods from his cost price. (An example or two may ~e 
in order, i.e. A merchant desires to sell his goods for a 
price to yield him a gross profit of 30 per cent of his 
sales price. How does he determine the selling price on 
an item costing him $137.20? He knows if 30 per cent of 
the selling price is profit, then the initial cost to him 
equals 7 0 per cent of the selling price. So he divides 
$137.20 by 70 to learn 1 per cent (or $1.96) and multi~ 
plies by 100 to obtain the selling price which is $196.00. 
Similarly, a borrower wants to obtain cash in the amount 
of $550.00 from an industrial loan company. How large 
a loan must he make on a 15 month basis to yield. 
$550.00? The amount of the loan is 100 per cent subject 
to a deduction of interest equal to 15 per cent and a 
deduction of the fee of 2 per cent, or a total deduction 
of 17 per cent. The cash he is to receive will equal· 83 
per cent of the amount of the loan. Divide $550.00 by 83 
to learn 1 per cent which is $6.6264. Multiplied by 100 
this will give $662.64 as the amount of loan necessary 
to yield $550.00 net proceeds. From the face of the loan 
( 662.64) is deducted interest ( 15%) in the amount of 
$99.39 fee (2%) in the amount of $13.25, making a 
total deduction of $112.64). 
In the case before the court, the borrowers applied 
for a loan-not for $1000 but for a loan-in an amount 
sufficient to give them net cash proceeds of at least $1000. 
(See Tr., Page 20). We submit that the borrowers wanted 
to make a loan on which there would be the desired 
amount left, after charges had been deducted. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
For convenience in discussing the matter, counsel 
have divided this brief into the following points: 
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THE MANNER OF COMPUTING AND THE 
AMOUNT OF INTEREST WHICH MAY BE CHARG~ 
ED IS STATUTORY: 
THE ST_t\TUTE (SECTION 7~8~3, U.C.A. 1953) 
IS SUBJECT TO ONLY ONE INTERPRETATION; 
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY RESPONDENTS 
ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE. 
The foregoing points will be discussed in order. 
MANNER OF COMPUTING AND AMOUNT 
OF INTEREST WHICH MAY BE CHARGED 
IS STATUTORY. 
It is apparently well understood that the Legislature 
may determine within its constitutional limitations what 
rate or rates of interest may be charged the public with 
respect to loans of money and may further prescribe how 
such interest shall be computed. Indeed the Legislature 
may prescribe, and in our state legislature has prescribed, 
more than one rate of interest and more than one method 
of computing it-depending upon the nature of the loan 
and the qualification of the lender. 
The General Interest Law found in Title 15, Chap~ 
ter 1, Sections 1 to 9, authorizes an interest charge of 10 
per cent per annum, computed on the unpaid balance of 
the loan. 
Under the Small Loan Act, Title 7, Ch~pter 10, Sec~ 
tions 1 to 24, interest is computed on the decreasing un ... 
paid balance of the loan at a stated rate by the actual 
number of days from payment to payment. 
A new Installment Sales Finance Act passed by the 
1953 Legislature (Senate Bill 138) provides for the addi .. 
tion of 1 per cent per month for the time the contract 
• 
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is to run on the full amount of the then unpaid balance 
of the contract. 
The Industrial Loan Act, Title 7, Chapter 8, Sec--
tion 1 to 12, where the interest on the face of the loan is 
deducted in advance. 
In addition there is other legislation on the subject 
of rates for credit unions, pawnbrokers, etc. 
Cases interpreting the provisions of one of these sta--
tutes are not necessarily applicable to the other. The 
Varney case, however, decided in 1930, construed our 
Industrial Loan Act and has been followed as the law 
of Utah since that time. 
At this point it might be well to discuss the actual 
issues involved in the Varney case and how the problem 
was resolved not. only by the Court but also by legisla--
tive action. The note involved in the case was dated March 
16, 1927. At that time the Industrial Loan Act (Laws of 
Utah 1925, Chapter 116) had been in effect less than 
two years. Insofar as we have been able to ascertain the 
original law was patterned after the California Indus--
trial Loan Act. The 1925 statute defined an industrial 
loan company and then authorized said lender to loan 
money "and to deduct interest thereon in advance at the 
rate of twelve ( 12% ) per cent of the face of said loan, and 
in addition, to require uniform wekly, semi ... monthly, or 
monthly installments." It did not provide, as does the 
present act, t h a t the uniform installments could 
be required, "with or w i t h o u t an allowance of 
interest on such installments." And it was the absence 
of that provision which presumably gave rise to the ques--
tion raised in. the Varney case to ·the effect that even 
though the law authorized interest to be deducted in ad ... 
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vance the la\v had to be read in conjunction with the 
general interest statute (then Section 3321, Compiled Laws 
of Utah 1917) \vhich required interest to be calculated 
on a ''per annum or by the year" basis. Thus, argued 
counsel for Miss Varney, interest, although calculated in 
advance and deducted had to be figured on the basis that 
the borrower received the use of $200.00 for one month, 
$180.00 for the second month, $160.00 for the third 
month and so on in reducing proportions on which such 
reducing portions only could the interest be calculated. 
Not only did the Supreme Court repudiate this theory 
but the Legislature in the interim amended the act (Laws . 
of Utah 1927, p. 72) by inserting the provision "with orC----- .. J-'~ 
without an allowance of interest on such installments" v · 
so that both the Legislature and the Court arrived at a . 
mutual understanding and interpretation of what the law 
intended. 
The other argument made by counsel for Miss Varney 
was that if the Industrial Loan Act was not construed 
in connection with the general interest statute it would be 
repugnant _thereto and void. At tl}at time the general in ... ·11 v 
terest statute made no exception in its provisions to the 
rate therein authorized. Although the Supreme Court re..-
fused to subscribe to Appellant's theory the Legislature in 
1935, in amending the general interest statute specifically iii )J 
excepted from the provisions thereof "such exceptions as 
are otherwise provided by law." 
In addition to the 1927 amendment above referred 
to at which time other amendments were made changing 
the rate of 12 per cent per annum to 1 per cent per 
month and fixing a maximum of two years for any such 
loan, the Legislature in 1945 added a proviso that the 2 
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per cent charge could not be assessed more often than once 
in a six months period. Other than these amendments, 
which indicate some careful regulation of the act, the Leg ... 
islature has failed in 12 general sessions to modify or 
change the statute so as to provide for a different method 
of calculating the interest to be charged by an indus ... 
trial loan corporation. 
If the Legislature did not approve of the interpreta ... 
tion given in the Varney case, they could have so stated. 
It is not proper to assume that the Legislature does not 
know what it is doing. The Legislature has, since the 
decision in the Varney case, legislated on consumer finance 
a number of times, and has in different acts provided for 
various ways of computing interest or charges, indicating 
it does understand the various rates and methods of com.-
putation provided for. It cannot be truthfully said that 
the Legislature is unaware of or indifferent to matters of 
consumer finance. 
This Court interpreted the Small Loan Act of Utah 
some years ago in the case of National Service Corpora.-
tion vs. Gardikis, 110 Utah 275, 172 Pac. 2d 120. Under 
the old act, this Court determined that one lender could 
have more than one loan with a borrower even though 
the total exceded $300.00. The Small Loan Act was 
promptly changed t~ provide that no borrower could owe 
more than $300.00 to one lender. 
THE STATUTE IS SUBJECT TO ONLY 
ONE INTERPRETATION 
While apparently conceding that the reasoning of 
the Supreme Court in the Varney case, supra, is sound 
and should not be modified, the Respondents have at.-
tempted in their brief on file herein to distinguish that 
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case from the case here involved. They argue that "the 
interesting distinction between the Varney case and the 
case at bar is that in the Varney case, the amount orig .... 
inally requested by Defendants and the face of the note 
are identical, \Yhich in the case at bar the amount request ... 
ed by Defendants and the face of the note are not iden .... 
tical." We call attention to the finding made by the 
trial court (apparently based on stipulations of counsel 
and which is not assailed on appea~ by respondents) : 
"2. That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1951, ~· ~­
the defendants applied to the plaintiff for a loan in 
an amount .sufficient to give them net~ 'a&l:J.~q~~eds ~ 
of at least $1,000.00, which was to be repaid withln.-
24 months." 
The foregoing finding certainly negates any such 
argument as Respondents attempt to advance to the ef .... 
feet that the two cases are not the same. But even as .... 
suming that when a person approaches a loan company 
to negotiate a loan he has in mind and mentions a cer .... 
tain amount of money which he seeks to obtain from 
the company by way of a loan, that is no factor re .... 
quiring a different method of computation of the interest. 
The Plaintiff company in the instant case made its com ... 
putation of interest and fee exactly in the same manner 
as did the Peoples Finance and Thrift Company in the 
Varney case. The facts in tbe latter ·case were stipulated 
to much as they were in the case now before the Court. 
In the stipulation it was agreed that Miss Varney ap .... 
plied for a loan of $200.00. It is not known whether she 
originally asked for the sum of $200.00 or requested a 
lesser sum, but whether she asked originally for $200.00 
and learned that she could not receive that amount and 
contented herself with less or whether she asked for less 
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and because it was calculated that the loan would have 
to be for $200.00 in order for her to realize the amount 
she desired, the same method of computing is involved. 
Miss Varney, the borrower, received $178.00. She 
was to repay the loan in ten months by ten equal monthly 
installments. Ten per cent of $178.00 is $17.80 and the 
lender deducted a $2.00 fee. If these figures are added 
together as contended by Responds should be done in 
this case, the note should have been for $197.80 and 
not for $200.00. In doing that, however, the clear Ian ... 
guage of the statute is not being followed, because putting 
together $17 8.00 and $19.80 or any other sum, is not 
deducting but is adding. In the Varney case the charges 
were based on the face amount of the note and the charges 
in the instant case are also based on the face amount of 
the note. 
Would it make a difference if the full amount of 
the note is handed to the borrower and then have him 
pay it back immediately, or paying out only the net pro ... 
ceeds in the first instance? The borrower had the option; 
he took out the net amount. 
If the borrower in the case of Peoples Finance and 
Thrift Company vs. Varney wanted to have $200.00 in ... 
stead of $178.00 should the rate be different, or the man ... 
ner of computing the charges be changed? The answer to 
that question is so obvious that it seems absurd to discuss 
it. Certainly the statute does not mean that it she want ... 
ed $200.00 the charges should be added, but if she want--
ed $178.00 they could be deducted. That is what the De ... 
fendants are contending in the instant case. The posi ... 
tion is not tenable. 
In the Varney case the. borrower wanted net cash 
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proceeds of $178.00 and therefore had to make a loan 
of $200.00. In the instant case the borrower had to make 
a loan of $1,378.38 to obtain the net cash proceeds he 
desired. 
What has been said above with respect to the man .... 
ner of computing and deducting the interest applies with 
equal force to the manner of deducting the 2 per cent fee 
"for expense in examining and investigating the character 
and circumstances of the borrower." It frequently hap .... 
pens that when a prospective borrower makes applica .... 
tion for a loan he does so in order to pay off existing bills, 
so that the proceeds of the loan are used insatisfying the 
creditors of the borrower. In such case the borrower may 
authorize, and the lender may require, that individual 
checks be made out to. the respective creditors for the 
amounts owing them. In such case the borrower signs 
what is known as an authorization to pay the proceeds of 
the loan to specific individuals. One of the borrower's 
debts created by the making of the loan in the instant 
case was the debt of 2 per cent of the face of the loan 
for the lender's expense in examining and investigating 
the matter. Here again the borrower "authorized" the 
deduction of the fee from the proceeds payable to him in 
order that this debt be satisfied. If the borrower had suffi .... 
cient money to pay the fee from his own pocket, then the' ~,H', '' ,' 
. t t-. 't o-;'' • 
amount thereof would not have been retained by the t · ~ -
l 
lender but would have been paid to him as part of the! 
proceeds of the loan. Thus in the Varney case, where.~ a· 
f~e of $2.00 was charged, if the borrower had paid the 
fee from her own funds she would have received $180.00 
instead of $178.00-the actual amount paid to her after 
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deducting the interest and withholding the amount of the 
fee by the lender. 
Operators under the Industrial Loan Act originally 
thought they understood the language of the statute and 
governed themselves accordingly. That interpretation was 
challenged and the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the 
Act in the case of Peoples Finance and Thrift Company 
vs. Varney and reached the same conclusion as to the 
meaning of the statute as the lenders had. Business peo~ 
ple have followed that interpretation and have loaned in 
perfectly good faith many millions of dollars. Should it not 
now be up to the Legislature to change the law if a change 
is to be made? 
This Court in Cobb vs. Hartenstein, 4 7 Utah 17 4, 
152 Pac. 424, said: 
"Since usury laws are quasi penal, the court will 
not hold a contract to be in violation of the usury 
laws, unless upon a fair and reasonable construction 
of all of its terms, in view of the dealings of the 
parties, it is manifest that the intent of the parties 
r was to engage in such a transaction as is forbidden 
~ by those laws. If two reasonable constructions are 
possible, by one of which the contract will be legal, 
while by the other it will be usurious and invalid, 
the Court will adopt the former.'' 
Further in the same case we find: 
"It is further stated the offense of usury is not 
( complete unless there is an unlawful intent to violate 
\ the usury statute." 
How by any source of reasoning can an attempt or 
intent to violate the usury law be found in this case when 
the Appellant has not only followed what appears to be 
the law, but does exactly what this Court has said is 
the law. 
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Cobb Ys. Hartenstein, supra, was cited with approval 
by this Court by four of the present members of this Court 
in Mathis vs. Holland Furnace Company, 166 Pac. 2d 
518: 
" .. -\. contract to be usurious, must be so when )--
made . and it is essential that a corrupt-or unlawful · 
intent ·to·· violate the usury law, at least on the part 
of the lender be proved to render the contract 
usurious." 
The penalty for usury being "penal" in nature, this 
law must be con trued strictly in favor of the lender. 
Edelstein vs. Hub Loan Company, 33 Atlantic 2d. 
829, 130 NJL 511: 
''Provision of Small Loan Act permitting bor~ 
rower to recover from lender any sum paid to lender 
in connection with loan in event of violation of limita~ 
tion on charges imposed upon lender is 'penal~-- and 
as such to be strictly construed in favor of lender." 
And in Maellaro vs. Maddison Finance Company, 31 
Atlantic 2d. 485, 130 NJL 140: 
"The Small Loan Act is generally 'remedial' in 
nature, but the provisions enjoining the imposition of 1: 
charges and expenses not specificially authorized are, 
highly 'penal' and are therefore to be strictly con~ 
strued.'' 
In the case of Tholen vs. Duffy, 7 Kan. Rep. 405, 
the Defendant Duffy loaned money to Tholen. A note for 
$1';000.000 was signed which provided for the payment 
of 12 per cent interest in advance. Duffy held out $120.00 
and gave Tholen 880.00. Usury was claimed on the 
ground the interest should have been figured on the sum 
of $880.00. The Court held the note was not usurious, 
stating: 
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"Twelve per cent is the highest legal"_;illleHst_ 
which by the terms of our law, parties may contract 
to pay. Exacting this amount in advance, practically 
gives to the lender more than 12 per cent on the amount 
the borrower actually has the use of during the time 
of the loan. It seems difficult upon principal to sus .. 
tain such a transaction. But in cases where note or 
bill is given, it is supported by such an overwhelming 
current of decision, and is a matter of such universal 
practice, that it may well be considered as engraft .. 
ed upon the law as a settled rule. It was so settled 
f. qefore the passage of our interest law; and if the Leg .. 
! }:::- islature had intended to change thi$ rule of construe-
~ , tion, such intention would have been plainly ex .. 
pressed." (Italics added). 
Again, in Federal National Bank vs. Wilhelm, 246 
Pac. 478 (an Oklahoma case decided in 1926) the borrow .. 
er claimed that he borrowed $1 ,500.00 from the bank and 
executed a note for $1 ,666.50, the $166.50 being charged 
as interest; that said $166.50 was usurious because it ex .. 
ceeded 10 per cent. The statute there provided: 
"The interest which would become due at the 
end of a term for which a loan is made, not exceed .. 
ing one year's interest in all, may be deducted from 
the loan in advance if the parties thus g.~" 
In upholding the transaction, the Court said: 
"The note was for $1 ,666.50, and ran for a term 
of one year. Ten per cent interest on the note for 
one year would amount to $166.65. Deducting this 
from the amount of the note, leaves $1,499.85. T'he 
Plaintiff admits he received $1,500.00 or 15 cents 
more than he was entitled to after interest was de.-
ducted. Since 15 cents less than 10 per cent of the 
principal was deducted as interest, the original note 
was therefore not usurious." 
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.-\UTHORITIES CITED BY RESPONDENT ARE 
NOT .A.PPLIC~A.BLE TO THE INSTANT CASE 
We have examined the various authorities cited and 
quoted by respondents and find that in every case the . 
statute involved \Vas different from that now before the 
court for interpretation. Ho\\rever, in several of the cases 
the court's decision by dictum upholds the views herein 
expressed: In the case of McCall vs. Herring (Georgia) 
4 2 S.E. 468, the court first determined that "A money 
lender cannot, in this state, lawfully contract for or re ... 
serve any greater rate of interest than 8 per cent. per an ... 
num." However, even in the absence of a statute author ... 
izing the deduction of the interest in advance, the Georgia 
Supreme Court had previously determined in the case of 
Mackenzie vs. Flannery, 90 Ga. 590, 16 S.E. 710, that 
"to take 8 per cent interest in advance by way of dis ... n.-'' ' 
count on short loans, in the usual and ordinary course 
of business, is not usurious." A fortiori, if the legislature 
of the state of Georgia had enacted a statute authorizing 
the deduction of interest in advance, no question would 
have been presented in the McCall case, supra. 
In the case of Agostini vs. Colonial Trust Company 
(Delaware) 36 A(2d) 33, the court was concerned with 
a loan made under the Delaware General Interest Statute 
which provides: 
"Legal Rate; Usury; Penalty:-The lawful rate 
of interest for the loan or use of money, in all cases 
where no express contract shall have been made 
for a less rate, shall be six per cent per annum; and 
when a rate of interest for the loan or use of money 
exceeding that established by law shall have been 
reserved or contracted for, the borrower or debtor 
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shall not be required to pay the creditor the excess 
over the legal rate . . . " (Italics added). 
It will be noted that the above statute is similar to 
our general interest law in excepting those situations where 
the statute otherwise authorizes a greater rate or different 
rate of interest to be charged. In discussing this matter 
the court, in the Agostini case, stated that "unless justi ... 
fied by some other statute or rule of law, the rate actually 
called for by the agreement must be held unlawful." The 
lender contended that the agreement was authorized by the 
"Small Loan Act." This Act authorized a lender, qualify ... 
ing under the law, to loan an amount not exceeding Five 
Hundred Dollars and "charge in advance the legal rate of 
interest of. six per cent upon the entire amount of the 
loan and may make such loan repayable in weekly, month ... 
ly or other periodical installments" plus a two per cent 
investigation fee. The court went on to hold that deduct ... 
ing interest in advance on short term loans was well recog ... 
nized and not repugnant in law, even in the absence of 
statute. The actual face amount of the loan was $8,000.00, 
which was in excess of the amount authorized to. be 
loaned under the Act and the Court went on further to 
hold that the loan was for a long term and therefore inter ... 
est could not be deducted in advance. Under our state 
there is both a limi,t~~ion ~f the amount o£ the loan and 
the tim~ .w.ithin which it must be repaid. The Appellant 
has complied with both of these requirements and no issue 
is raised that the loan was either in excess of the author--
ized amount or that it was for a longer period than author .. 
ized by the Act. 
In the case of Connor vs. Minier, (California 1930) 
288 Pac. 23, the Appellate Court had before it the ques .. 
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tion of determining whether the loan was usurious under 
the general usury law of California. The defendant raised 
the issue in its ans\\rer to the cross ... complaint that it was 
qualified to do business under the industrial loan law of 
California, but the court in reviewing this matter on ap ... 
peal held: 
" . . . this was an affirmative allegation, which 
it was required to prove. If this fact is a defense to 
the charge of usury, the plaintiff might also have 
proved it under the statutory replication given him 
by Section 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But 
the record discloses neither proof of this fact nor at ... 
tempt to prove it." 
At that time the statutes of California (from which 
it appears that our own Industrial Loan Act was taken) 
authorized an industrial loan corporation "To loan money 
on personal security, or otherwise, and to deduct interest 
there/or in advance at the rate of six per cent per annum, 
or less, and, in addition, to receive and to require uniform 
weekly or monthly installments on its certificates of in ... 
vestment, purchased by the borrower simultaneously with 
the said loan transaction, or otherwise, and pledged with_~ 
the corporation as security for the said loan, with or with ... 
out an allowance of interest on such installments. (St! 
1917, p. 658; St. 1921, p. 729) "From the italicized por ... 
tion of the statute it can readily be observed where our 
legislature obtained the phrase "deduct interest therefor 
in advance" as well as the phrase "with or without an al ... 
lowance of interest on such installments." Under the hold ... 
ing of the court in the Connor Case, there appears no 
doubt that the court would have upheld the deduction of 
interest in advance, (just as our court did in the Varney 
Case) if the lender had proved that it qualified under the 
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Industrial Loan Act. In the instant case there is no dis ... 
pute but that Appellant was qualified under the Indus ... 
trial Loan Act, and the lower court so found. 
In the later California case cited by respondents 
(Taylor vs. Budd, 18 P. 2d 333) the loan was not made 
under the Industrial Loan Act, but even if it were claimed 
so to be, the rate charged was 12 per cent in advance, in ... 
stead of the six per cent authorized by that Act. 
/ (It may be noted that the Industrial Loan Act of 
California, quoted above, has since been amended so that 
a different rate of interest may be charged depending upon 
the amount of the loan-ranging from 2lf2 per cent per 
month to 10 per cent per annum. Deerings California 
Finance Code Ann., Sec. 18655. Under our statutes 
the rate of interest varies from 3 per cent per month to 10 
per cent per annum. In each case the particular statute 
involved indicates whether the interest is paid on the un ... 
paid balance or calculated in advance and deducted from 
the face of the note) . 
Respondents also refer to the case of McKanna vs. 
Thorne (Okla. 1922) 209 Pac. 1039, where the Court 
held that under the la"r of Oklahoma, 10 per cent inter--
est is the maximum amount which the lender was per--
mitted to charge. The loan in that case, however, was 
for the sum of $6,000.00 for a period of five years. At 
that time Oklahoma had a law (Compiled Statutes 1921, 
Section 5104) authorizing interest to be deducted in ad--
vance "if the parties thus agree" where the loan is for 
a term of one year. In construing this statute the Court 
in the later case of Federal National Bank vs. Wilhelm, 
supra, authorized the interest to be deducted in advance as 
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provided by the statute. See also Covington vs. Fisher, 
22 Okla. ~07. 97 Pac. 615. 
SUMMARY 
In conclusion, counsel again desire to express their 
appreciation for the opportunity afforded to file the fore, 
going Brief. The matter before the Court might well affect ·· 
the validity of thousands of loans and millions of dollars 
advanced by sound and reputable finance institutions who 
have qualified to do business under the Industrial Loan 
Act and whose operations are subject to supervision and 
audit by the Banking Commissioner of Utah, similiar to 
banks and trust companies. While we have not attempt..-
ed to go into the social aspects of the law there is much 
that might be stated in justification of an "industrial loan y 
rate" of interest as well as a "small loan rate"-separate 
and distinct from the general interest rate prescribed under 
Title 15, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. As a 
matter of fact, if the interpretation given the Industrial 
Loan Act by the lower court is upheld (which would 
require the overruling of the Varney case, supra) there 
would be very little, if any, difference in the rate of inter..- /( f.-'t c, 
est which might . be charged under the general interest-, 
statute and under the Industrial Loan Act. As we view ' 
the entire picture relating to loan transactions there are 
three general gradations of interest which might be charg ... 
ed, the industrial loan rate, being the middle, the small 
loan rate authorizes 3 per cent per month while the gen ... 
eral interest statute (15..-1..-2 U.C.A. 1953) authorizes 1 
per cent per month on amounts of $100.00 or less and 10 t 'f 
per cent per annum on amounts in excess of $100.00. 
We submit that both the Legislature and the Supreme 
Court of this State have heretofore and for a long period 
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of time recognized the plain, clear, convincing, unequivocal 
and specific language of the Industrial Loan Act which 
authorizes a person qualified under such Act "to deduct 
interest ... in advance at the rate of 1 per cent or less 
of the face of such loan per month." The authorities cited 
and relied upon by Respondents are not in point, but in 
any event, do not indicate that a different construction of 
the language of the Act should be made. In fact most 
of the authorities referred by Respondents do recognize the 
validity of deducting interest in advance where it is author.-
ized by statute, or accepted by commercial practice on 
loans for short periods of time. 
We urge the Court to affirm the decision of . the 
Varney case by determining that upon the basis of the 
facts and the findings of the Court, the loan here in ques.-
tion was not usurious but that the method of calculating 
the interest and the deduction of such interest and fee was 
proper under the statute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B. R. PARKINSON 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
Counsel, Amicus Curiae. 
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